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Made in the USA Foundation v. United States:




After years of negotiation and domestic political conflict, the
United States, Mexico and Canada adopted the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.1 Four years later, the
Made in the USA Foundation and the United Steel Workers of
America filed suit in the Northern District of Alabama,2 charg-
ing the United States with passing NAFTA in violation of the
Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution. 3 The plaintiffs
argued that Congress, in passing NAFTA, did not abide by the
procedures outlined in Article 2, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution (the Treaty Clause) 4 and that the Treaty Clause5
outlines a specific procedure for adopting treaties. Because Con-
gress passed NAFTA using a simple majority of both houses
rather than a supermajority of one house, NAFTA was argued to
be unconstitutional. 6 In a lengthy, largely well-reasoned opin-
ion, Judge Probst found NAFTA constitutional.7
The opinion in Made in the USA Foundation v. United
States raises three critical issues: (1) whether the Supreme
Court has the power to negate treaties that violate the Constitu-
1. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S. C. §§3301-3473 (1993)).
2. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp.2d 1226
(N.D. Ala. 1999). See also George Becker, NAFTA is Unfair - and Unconstitu-
tional: First, this 'Trade Agreement' is Really a Treaty and Needed Senate Ap-
proval. Second, NAFTA Betrays America, PITTSBURGH POST GAzETTE, August 5,
1998, at A7 (reviewing arguments of the plaintiffs by Becker, international
president of the United Steelworkers of America); David Rubenstein, Steelwork-
ers Try to Dismantle NAFTA in Federal Court Battle, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, April,
1999, at 1.
3. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur...").
4. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1229.
5. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
6. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1278.
7. See id. at 1323.
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tion; (2) whether NAFTA constitutes a "treaty" either as envi-
sioned by the framers or as defined under contemporary
international law; and (3) whether the Treaty Clause provides
the sole means of adopting treaties. The Supreme Court has
never reviewed the latter two issues.8 While the Made in the
USA decision may be politically necessary, 9 it serves to under-
mine the text of the Constitution, and makes the Treaty Clause
obsolete. Because Congress did not comply with the require-
ments of the Treaty Clause in adopting NAFTA, the agreement
is unconstitutional and Probst's decision should be overturned.
This Comment seeks to revitalize the Treaty Clause and
protect the integrity of the Constitution through a judicial over-
turning of NAFTA. Part I outlines the adoption of the Treaty
Clause and the traditional analysis that courts apply to cases
involving treaties and international agreements. It also reviews
the history of fast-track negotiating authority and the passage of
NAFTA. Part II recounts the holding and reasoning in Made in
the USA Foundation. Part III questions the validity of the
court's reasoning that Congress held the authority to negotiate
NAFTA using fast-track negotiating authority. This Comment
concludes that the district court erred in finding NAFTA
constitutional.
8. See id. at 1229 ("remarkably, in the over two hundred years of this na-
tion, the Supreme Court of the United States has not specifically and defini-
tively decided the principles applicable to" what constitutes and treaty and
whether the Treaty Clause offers an exclusive means of forming binding inter-
national agreements). See also ELBERT M. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND ExEcUTIvE
AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 114-15 (1960) (noting that wide use of in-
ternational agreements "apparently convinced attorneys appearing before the
Supreme Court that it would be useless to argue that an international agree-
ments is invalid because it is not a 'treaty'").
9. As the United States argues in the principal case, a decision finding
NAFTA unconstitutional could potentially damage both trade relations and our
international bargaining power. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at
1249-51. However, as this Comment explains, a decision for the plaintiffs
would not limit the Government's ability to enter into international and trade
agreements. See infra, note 163 and accompanying text (explaining the feasi-
bility of a balance between constitutionally mandated procedures and efficient
congressional-executive agreements). See also Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty
Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1092 (1990) (arguing that the controversy over
executive agreements is a matter of constitutional norms and domestic rela-
tions not international norms and foreign relations).
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II. THE TREATY CLAUSE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
A. THE TREATY CLAUSE
THE HISTORY OF THE TREATY CLAUSE
While drafting the Constitution, the framers discussed with
great passion and detail' ° the Treaty Clause, which states that
the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur."" According to the framers, dis-
cussions involved three key concerns.
First, to ensure that the fledgling nation formed no interna-
tional agreements that might oppress certain regions of the
country, all treaties required approval by the Senate. 12 This
10. See James Madison, Helvidus, No. I, in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, VOL. I. 1769-1793 611, 615 (By Order of Congress, 1865)
(stating that the clause was essentially important because treaties "sometimes
have the effect of changing not only the external laws of the society but operate
also on the internal code"); See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
US CONSTrrUmON 175 (1996) (recognizing treaties as a matter of special con-
cern to framers). See generally RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES:
1789-1817 at 1 (1920).
Note that treaties warrant mention distinct from mere laws in article. II,
§2 and in the supremacy clause. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2.
11. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, subd. 1. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 64
(John Jay) (indicating that the framers selected the senators based on their
integrity, lengthier terms, greater detailed knowledge and dedication to na-
tional interests).
At the Constitutional Convention, participants made an attempt to give the
House of Representatives a role in the approval of treaties, but the delegates
voted down the proposal ten to one. See Joel D. Joseph, Why NAFTA Violates
the Constitution, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., July 16, 1998, at Bl. Instead,
the Constitution limited the role of the House to deliberating "on the expediency
or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act
thereon, as in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good." See 4
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 769 (1786) [1795-1795]. In other words, the framers lim-
ited the House to engaging in what is necessary and proper to implement a
treaty. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The framers also objected
to any delegation of the authority to make international agreements. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay). This included involvement of the House, be-
cause it would involve the concurrence of too many different bodies. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Howard R. Sklamberg, The
Meaning of "Advice and Consent": The Senate's Constitutional Role in
Treatymaking, 18 MicH. J. INT'L L 445, 449-455 (1997) (evaluating the role of
the "Senatorial Dominance Model," which places responsibility for treatymak-
ing with the Senate, in interpreting framers intent as evidenced by behavior at
the constitutional convention).
MINv: J GLOBAL TRADE
guaranteed equal representation by each state.'3 To provide
greater protection for regional and state interests, the framers
required that a super-majority (two-thirds of all Senators) ap-
prove any treaties adopted.' 4
Second, to provide the new government with greater author-
ity to engage convincingly in international negotiations, the
framers opted to include the executive branch in the treaty rati-
fication process. 15 As originally proposed, the authority to make
treaties would have been entrusted solely to a majority of the
Senate, with no presidential participation. 16 The framers, how-
ever, decided that this structure entrusted too much power to
the Senate, and amended the provision to include an active pres-
idential role. 17 As a result, the Constitution gives primary au-
thority for negotiations to the Executive Branch.18 Finally, the
framers feared encroachments by one branch against the na-
tion's liberty. Therefore, they instituted the requirement for
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) (stating that the Senate pre-
serves equal influence by each state).
14. See Madison, supra note 10, at 617 (defending concurrence of two-
thirds as necessary, to prevent hasty action); THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (noting two-thirds requirement insures approval by a national
majority); THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) (stating that "as all the States are
equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most will-
ing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal
degree of influence in that body"); THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (arguing that the two-thirds rule is "one of the best digested and most un-
exceptionable parts of the plan").
With early treaties, the Senate participated in both its "advice and consent"
and approval roles. See U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2; THoMAs M. FRANCK AND
EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY By CONGRESS 135-7 (1979). However by
1814, when the United States negotiated the Treaty of Ghent (Treaty of Peace
and Amity, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218, TS 109, 12 Bevans 41), the Senate no
longer sought to advise the President prior to treaty negotiation. See RALSTON
HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES (1789-1817) (1920). For an analysis of the
"advice and consent" duty see generally Sklamberg, supra note 12, at 448 (advo-
cating in favor of a return to an active Senate role in the negotiation of treaties).
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
16. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding
that the framers made the treaty power available to the President, "the chief
executant of foreign relations under our constitutional scheme," with the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as a means to accomplishing the public
purpose of effective foreign affairs).
17. See id.
18. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319,
57 S. Ct. 216, 220 (1936); see also Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional
Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406 (1989).
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Senate approval of negotiated treaties as a check on executive
authority.19
The framers, when writing and discussing the Treaty
Clause, failed to define the meaning of the term "treaty" within
the text.20 But Emmerich de Vattel, the leading legislative
scholar of the time, in The Law of Nations, made distinctions
between treaties and agreements. 2 1 Vattel indicated a differ-
ence based on importance and duration. 22 Chief Justice Taney
recognized the influence of Vattel on the framers' conception of
treaties, noting that treaties had greater consequences than
non-treaty agreements. 23 The Supreme Court, in an attempt to
provide a framework for reviewing international agreements,
has defined a treaty as an agreement requiring ratification by
two-thirds of the Senate. 24
TREATY CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has never reviewed the exclusivity of
the Treaty Clause, but lower courts have remarked on it.25 In
19. See Madison, supra note 10, at 614-15 (emphasizing that a treaty is a
law and therefore requires participation by the legislature to avoid tyranny);
THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the nation should
not entrust its entire treaty making power to individual men, who by their very
nature, cannot be trusted); see also HENK.N, supra note 10, at 36-37 (noting the
deliberate shift by the framers to a check oriented system for treaty making in
the Constitution based on their experience with the failed system included in
the Articles of Confederation).
20. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing what
treaties do, but failing to define what they are). See also HENKIN, supra note 10,
at 175-76 (the framers did not differentiate treaties from international
agreements).
21. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS, §§§ 152, 153, 192
(1775). Scholarship on the views of the framers regarding Treaties cites the
strong influence of their contemporaneous scholar, Monsieur De Vattel and his
work The Law of Nations. See, e.g.,Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agree-
ment Replace the Treaty? 53 Yale L.J. 664, 668 (1944). Cf James Madison, Let-
ter to Thomas Jefferson, May 8, 1793, in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIs BASIC
WRITINGS 257 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (discussing role of Vattel in contem-
porary debates on the role of Treaties); Madison, supra note 10, at 611, 614
(noting Vattel as controlling scholar on the role of the legislature in interna-
tional affairs).
22. See VATrEL, supra note 21 (arguing that Treaties involve issues of
greater national importance and are of a longer duration than agreements).
23. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569-70 (1840). See also
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242-43 (1872) (Justice Clifford writing for
the court).
24. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99, 5 S. Ct. 247, 254 (1884);
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30, 102 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (1982).
25. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1226. See, e.g.,New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (invalidating treaty be-
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the 1892 case of In Re Sutherland, the District Court of Oregon
noted:
[Ilt does not appear that the treaty aforesaid... has ever been con-
firmed by the United States senate. The constitution (article 2, sec. 2)
gives the president power to make treaties, 'with the advice and con-
sent of the senate' and not without it. So far as appears, the senate not
having advised and consented to this so-called 'treaty,' it has no legal
force, and the proceedings taken thereunder are of no avail.26
While no higher court has adopted this language, neither has
any higher court explicitly repudiated it. The former United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 27 differentiated
treaties from international compacts, arguing that the latter did
not require Senate approval. 28 The Tenth Circuit declined to
consider whether an international promise constitutes an en-
forceable treaty or an executive agreement. 29 Citing the polit-
cause it violated the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings Clause); Ed-
wards v. Carter, 580 F.2d at 1056 (upholding treaty against suit by House of
Representatives challenging the return of Panama Canal to Panama as an un-
constitutional transfer of property), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2240 (May 15, 1978);
cf. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (recognizing the Missouri
Compromise Act's prohibition on slavery as an unconstitutional taking and
therefore invalidating the Act. Congress adopted the Missouri Compromise Act
to implement the Louisiana purchase treaty). See also; Byrd, supra note 8, at
87-88 (evaluating decisions invalidating treaty implementation acts); WILLARD
BUNCE COwLES, TREATIES AND CoNsTITUrIoNAL LAw: PROPERTY INFERENCES
AND DuE PROCESS OF LAw 159-176 (1941) (discussing the Dred Scott case for its
role in treaty interpretation).
26. 53 F. 551, 552 (D. Or. 1892).
27. Succeeded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
28. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P.A. 52, 64, 275 F.2d
472, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
29. See Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 1110 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Gold-
water v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003-04, 100 S. Ct. 533, 537 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing whether decision to withdraw from
a treaty requires Senate approval is a political question); Michael J. Glennon,
Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 814 (1989)
(evaluating the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs). But see Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Chief Justice Marshall) (construing trea-
ties as equivalent to an act of the legislature and therefore within the review of
the Court); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898) (arguing
that "statutes enacted by Congress, as well as treaties made by the President
and Senate, must yield to the paramount and supreme law of the Constitu-
tion"); THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating: "The treaties of
the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law
of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all
other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations."); THE FEDERALIST No. 80
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that courts must review treaties as part of their
role in preserving the national peace). See generally BYRD, supra note 8, at 83-
110; HENKIN, supra note 10, at 198-204; COwLES, supra note 25, at 12 (indicat-
ing that unconstitutional treaties are invalid and unenforceable).
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ical question doctrine, the court held that this issue was not one
for the courts to decide.30 The Ninth Circuit has held that until
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate a treaty remains without
force. 3 ' The absence of Constitutional jurisprudence on this
subject has allowed the President and Congress to expand their
use of the congressional-executive agreement as a substitute for
a formal treaty.
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
Congressional-executive agreements do not follow the nor-
mal course of conduct under the Constitution in that they give
the President greater latitude in forming international agree-
ments.3 2 In some agreements, Congress authorizes the Presi-
dent to conclude agreements already negotiated.3 3 In others,
Congress adopts implementing legislation or allocates funds to
meet obligations created by Executive action.34 The United
States enters congressional-executive agreements through a two
step process: the President negotiates terms with one or more
foreign governments; Congress then approves the terms through
either a statute or joint resolution.35
THE HISTORY OF THE CONGREssIONAL-EXEcuTrVE AGREEMENT
Prior to World War II, the United States entered into ap-
proximately 1,000 treaties and 200 executive agreements involv-
ing both international trade and foreign relations. 36 Starting in
the 1940s, a shift occurred as American scholars and politicians
started to defend the use of congressional-executive agreements
30. See Dole, 569 F.2d at 1110; See generally, Glennon, supra note 29, at
814 (defining political questions as nonjusticiable question involving issues best
left to political branches to resolve); See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962) (establishing balancing test to determine if an issue is a political
question).
31. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. International Swiss Inv. Corp., 895
F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).
32. See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency
and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 726-27 (1998).
33. See HENIUN, supra note 10, at 215 (citing the Headquarters Agreement
with the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund agreements as
examples).
34. See id. at 216.
35. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108
HARv. L. REv. 799, 804-5 (1995).
36. John B. Rehm, Making Foreign Policy Through International Agree-
ment, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 126, 127
(Francis 0. Wilcox and Richard A. Frank eds., 1976).
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as an alternative method of forming international agreements. 37
Beginning in the New Deal era, the United States negotiated a
number of substantial agreements using the congressional-exec-
utive agreement such as the Bretton Woods Agreement.38 De-
spite protests by the Senate, which has been politically
restrained from blocking agreements because they are not
passed as treaties, the growing use of these agreements has
continued.39
During the 1940s and 1950s, both houses of Congress
passed numerous amendments proposing to alter the manner in
which the United States enters international agreements. 40 In
the 1940s, the House approved several amendments to replace
the Senate supermajority requirement and replace it with a vote
by both Houses.4 1 In the 1950s, the Senate considered the most
famous, the Bricker Amendment, which proposed replacing trea-
ties with congressional legislation on foreign policy. 42 Attempts
to pass the Bricker Amendment failed by a close margin because
of opposition by both the Eisenhower administration and influ-
ential members of Congress. 43 They felt that the proposed
amendment would place excessive power over foreign affairs in
the House.44
While the United States used the congressional-executive
agreement broadly after World War II, it became the preemi-
37. See QuINcY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1922); HENIN, supra note 10, at 215-18. But see Edwin Borchard, Treaties
and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L. REv. 616 (1945) (opposing the
growth of congressional-executive agreements and their replacement of the
treaty).
38. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act (providing for participation in the
International Monetary Fund), ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512 (1945); United States
-Israel Free Trade Area, Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82 (1985); United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
39. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 417 (noting the historical resistance of
the Senate to adopt agreements which circumvent the Treaty adoption proce-
dure); see also REHM, supra note 36, at 126 (critiquing executive agreements
because "through executive agreements the president can make international
commitments that evade congressional consideration but still commit the
United States to serious, and even questionable courses of action).
40. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 862-889.
41. See id, at 864, n.289.
42. See Rehm, supra note 36, at 128. See also Edward Corwin, The Presi-
dent's Treaty Making Power, in CORWnIS CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS AND INSIGHTS
OF EDWARD S. CORWIN 211-17 (Kenneth D. Crews, ed. 1986) (critiquing the then
recently proposed Bricker Amendment as both unnecessary and destructive to
the structure of the government).
43. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 899 (describing the history of
the Bricker Amendment).
44. See id. at 899 n.450.
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nent means of forming trade agreements following the passage
of the Trade Act of 1974.45 The Trade Act created a new "fast
track" means of negotiating and approving international trade
agreements." 46 Under fast track, a form of congressional-execu-
tive agreement, the President begins preliminary negotiations
with other nations and notifies both houses of Congress of his
intentions.47 So long as the President fulfills his statutory obli-
gations,48 the bill passes straight to both houses for vote by the
entire chamber.49
The United States entered its first regional free trade agree-
ments utilizing the fast track route, and also utilized fast track
provisions in its consideration of proposals under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 50
IN DEFENSE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
Two schools of thought defend the rising use of the congres-
sional-executive agreement and the corresponding decline in
Congress's use of the Treaty Clause. The first, adopted by the
same scholars who originally advocated the expansive use of
congressional-executive agreements, involves the theory of
interchangeability. 51
Interchangeability is the theory that the congressional-exec-
utive agreement evolved out of the formal treaty, negotiated by
the president and approved by a supermajority of the Senate.
As a result, it can be legitimately used to form fully binding in-
45. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 2101-2487, 88 Stat. 1978
(1975).
46. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 143
(1995).
47. See § 2112(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974; see also Theresa Wilson, Who
Controls International Trade? Congressional Delegation of the Foreign Com-
merce Power, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 141, 170 (1998) (outlining the structure and
application of "fast track").
48. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track And United States Trade Pol-
icy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 147 (1992) (describing Presidential responsibili-
ties as including notification of the House Ways and Means Committee and
Senate Finance Committee, and performing other minor procedural
requirements).
49. See Wilson, supra note 47, at 171.
50. See JACKSON, supra note 46, at 147-49, 487-92.
51. See WALLACE McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEM-
OCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 32
(1941); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execu-
tive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Pol-
icy, 54 YALE L. REv. 181 (1945).
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ternational agreements. 52 Proponents argue that the President
and Congress draw their respective powers to form binding in-
ternational agreements from the Constitution:53 the President
through his authority to make Treaties54 and his powers as
Commander in Chief;55 and Congress from the Commerce
Clause,56 the Senate's right to approve treaties,57 and the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.58 Additionally, the inherent power of
the federal government to regulate foreign affairs provides gen-
eral external sovereignty to the President.59
The second theory, developed by Yale law professor Bruce
Ackerman, endorses the use of the congressional-executive
agreement as a substitute for the Treaty.60 Ackerman argues
that the Senate responded to the needs of the Roosevelt admin-
istration during World War II, by abdicating its responsibilities
under the Treaty Clause in favor of the congressional-executive
agreement.6 1 Because popular sentiment, as measured by news-
52. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 37; MCCLURE, supra note 51. But see
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 807, 813 (arguing that interchangeabil-
ity is a fundamentally flawed theory because it focuses on slow evolution and
advocating instead for a theory of constitutional moments which recognizes pe-
riods of major change in constitutional thinking).
53. See WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 232-6 (explaining the role of the execu-
tive and legislative branches in foreign affairs); HENKIN, supra note 10, at 34
(describing the President's enumerated and unenumerated powers in foreign
affairs).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. But see I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLI-
TICs 14 (1995) ("in no sphere of government policy can the primacy of the legis-
lature be clearer: Congress reigns supreme on trade"); Jacques J. Gorlin,
Foreign Trade and the Constitution, in FOREIGN POLICE AND THE CoNsTrrurIoN
54 (Robert A. Goldwin and Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
57. US. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
59. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316,
318, 320 (1936) (naming the President the "sole organ of the nation" in foreign
affairs); see generally THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). But see
Madison, supra note 10, at 621 (reasoning, "whatever doubts may be started as
to the correctness of its reasoning against the legislative nature of the power to
make treaties; its is clear, consistent and confident, in deciding that the power is
plainly and evidently not an executive power").
60. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35. Ackerman also sup-
ports portions of the interchangeability doctrine, arguing that the President
and Congress have independent congressional authority for their actions in the
adoption of international agreements. See id. at 919-23.
61. See id. at 869-896.
Ackerman believes law evolves based not on textual interpretation but
"constitutional moments." See generally, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE
(1991) (explaining Ackerman's entire theory), Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of
Betrayal?, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1519 (1997) (stating that "constitutional mean-
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paper poll data, favored a retreat from isolationism, the Ameri-
can people effectively ratified this change as an amendment to
the Constitution, and in doing so created an independently au-
thorized method of entering binding international agreements.6 2
Furthermore, the almost exclusive use of the congressional-exec-
utive agreement in the post-World War II period indicates that
the Senate, House and American people accept this alternative
to the Treaty Clause as constitutional.63 Ackerman argues that
Congress formalized this switch with the passage of the 1974
Trade Act, which created the fast track, congressional-executive
alternative to treaty negotiation for trade agreements.64 This
"rule of recognition," approving the congressional-executive
agreement, allowed Congress and the President to adopt
NAFTA. 65
ing is not primarily created by judges out of texts but emerges in the course of
the struggle by ordinary Americans to hammer out fundamental political un-
derstandings.") See also David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism,
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791, 1794 (1998) (responding to Harvard Law Professor Law-
rence Tribe's critique of the Ackerman & Golove article). Applying this theory
to the Treaty Clause, Ackerman explained that during World War II, Ameri-
cans responded to their immediate need for international policy by altering
their interpretation of the constitutional requirements for international agree-
ments. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 909-913. But see U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (stating "in the absence of a prop-
erly passed constitutional amendment," courts cannot "erode the structure en-
visioned by the framers"); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARv. L. REV. 1223 (1995); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past,
105 H v. L. REv. 918 (1992); Paul, supra note 32, at 682 (critiquing Acker-
man's thesis and calling for a return to Congressional involvement in interna-
tional affairs).
62. See cf. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 929. (arguing that popu-
lar sentiment and political necessity make use of the Article V amendment pro-
cedure unnecessary). See Ackerman, supra note 61, at 1527-28 (stating that to
ignore societal amendments during World War II era, and accept only amend-
ments adopted using Article V, is to betray the greatest generation of
Americans).
63. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 914-925 (citing the lack of
large-scale opposition to the shift away from the Treaty Clause). But see Made
in the USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp.2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999)
(representing a challenge to notions of popular approval of the shift to congres-
sional-executive agreements).
64. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 904-907 (asserting that the
fast track procedures codify the approval of the congressional-executive
process).
65. See id. at 924; Ackerman, supra note 62, at 1526-27.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States has evaluated the
constitutionality of numerous congressional-executive agree-
ments. In United States v. Belmont, the Court held that Con-
gress lawfully delegated to the President the power to make
unilateral decisions related to international trade.66 In another
decision involving executive authority in international trade,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Co., Justice Sutherland speaks
of a nearly unlimited executive power over international rela-
tions. 67 However, Justice Sutherland notes that even this power
"must be exercised in subordination of the applicable provisions
of the Constitution."68 The Supreme Court has never addressed
the question of whether congressional-executive agreements can
replace treaties.69
C. NAFTA
In 1991, pursuant to the 1974 Trade Act,70 then-President
George Bush and Congress began discussing the negotiation of a
66. See e.g. United States v. Belmont; 301 U.S. 324 (1936) (upholding Liti-
nov Assignment and recognizing the President's exclusive authority to negoti-
ate agreement recognizing other nations, here, the Soviet Union); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941) (settling foreign claims involving the Litinov As-
signment); Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 593, 601 (1912) (recogniz-
ing international compacts regulate commercial relations); Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) (allowing President to enter into binding agreements
involving commercial claims); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47
C.C.P.A. 52, 65 (CCPA 1959) (noting that international compacts such as proto-
cols, modus vivendi, postal conventions and tariff classifications do not require
treaty approval).
67. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
20 (1936) (stating "it is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary, and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal Government in the field
of international relations"). The dicta in this decision is considered politically
motivated because of Sutherland's involvement in Roosevelt's cabinet prior to
his appointment to the court.
68. Id. at 319-20.
69. See BYRD, supra note 8, at 115 and accompanying text (describing the
absence of Supreme Court review of the interchangeability of treaties and con-
gressional-executive agreements).
70. See 1974 Trade Act § 19 U.S.C. ch.12 (1999). See also DESTLER, supra
note 55, at 72 (noting that Congress adopted the 1974 Trade Act to extend the
President's trade negotiating authority by providing the President the freedom
and leverage to enter into international trade agreements); Alfred E. Eckes Jr.,
U.S. Trade History, in U.S. TRADE POLIcY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 51,
87 (William A. Lovett et al. eds., 1999) (stating, "[iun return for regular consul-
674 [Vol. 9:663
2000] MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION V. UNITED STATES 675
free trade agreement between the United States, Mexico and
Canada.71 Bush negotiated the treaty using the "fast track" pro-
visions included in the 1974 Act.7 2 On December 17, 1992, fol-
lowing congressional approval, the three countries signed
NAFTA, the most comprehensive regional free trade pact ever
negotiated.7 3 Because Bush negotiated under "fast track" enact-
ment procedures, Congress was required to vote on the agree-
ment within ninety days of transmittal by President Clinton.7 4
Congress approved NAFTA on Dec. 8, 1993,75 and then adopted
the NAFTA Implementation Act to allow the government to en-
force provisions of NAFTA.7 6
The adoption of NAFTA was not without controversy.
While proponents of the Treaty defended it on the grounds that
it would improve the domestic economy and promote growth,
critics voiced fears of job loss, environmental damage and eco-
nomic downturn. 77 It was not until the congressional debates on
tation with Congress and private-sector representatives, Congress promised the
Executive to waive the usual congressional procedures and permit a vote within
90 days on implementing legislation").
After considerable debate, and in the face of opposition from opponents of
free trade, Congress renewed fast track authority in 1991. See DESTLE, supra
note 55, at 99-102. This authority expired in 1997 and due to partisan politics,
Congress failed to renew the authority. See E.J. Dionne, Jr. Get Ready for Clin-
ton's Third Act; He Seeks a Balance Between Hyperactive and Reactive, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 1998, at Cl.
71. See Koh, supra note 48, at 143 (discussing the use of fast track in U.S.
trade policy).
72. See id. Fast track "authorizes the President to initiate a foreign affairs
action, (for example, negotiation of an international trade agreement), but re-
quires him to notify, consult, and subsequently submit the product of that ac-
tion back to Congress for final, accelerated approval. Under modified House
and Senate rules, Congress "promises" the President that it will automatically
discharge the completed initiative from committee within a certain number of
days, bar floor amendment of the submitted proposal, and limit floor debate,
thereby ensuring the President and our trading partners that the submitted
legislative package will be voted up or down without alteration within a fixed
period of time." See id.
73. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549,
550 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cert. denied 510 U.S. 1041 (1994). See also H.R. REP. No.
103-361, at 8 (1993)(reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2558) (calling NAFTA "the
most comprehensive trade agreement ever negotiated").
74. See Public Citizen, 5 F.3d at 550.
75. See Tim Golden, Tariffs Drop as Trade Agreement Kicks in with New
Year's Arrival, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1994, at Al.
76. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) codified at 19 U.S. C. §§3301-3473.
77. See e.g. The 'Great Debate' Over Nafta, N. Y. TiMs, A16 (Nov. 9, 1993);
The 1993 Campaign; Transcript of 3d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton and
Perot, N. Y. TIMEs, A20 (quoting H. Ross Perot, "You implement that Nafta, the
Mexican trade agreement, where they pay people $1 an hour, have no health
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the agreement to approve the WTO, however, that commenta-
tors raised questions regarding the constitutionality of
NAFTA.78
The courts have considered other legal challenges to
NAFTA. Prior to the adoption of the agreement, environmental
organizations brought suit in the District of Columbia to require
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to produce envi-
ronmental impact statements prior to Treaty ratification. 79 The
D.C. Circuit Court held that because the executive branch had
not completed its statutorily required action, the court lacked
jurisdiction to review the USTR's action. 0 In a second case,
American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, the same
court reviewed the constitutionality of a binational review panel
which evaluates allegations of dumping in violation of the
treaty.8 ' The court found the review panel, and NAFTA,
constitutional.8 2
III. MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION: THE DECISION
The opinion in Made in the USA Foundation addresses the
legal challenges historically raised by political opponents of
NAFTA. The institutional plaintiffs, Made in the America Foun-
dation and the United Steelworks of America, represent workers
and union members in Alabama who lost their jobs between
1993 and 1997, allegedly as a result of NAFTA trade policies.83
Both plaintiffs objected to NAFTA before its implementation be-
cause they feared Mexican plants would take jobs from their
workers. The issues adjudicated were purely matters of law, as
care, no retirement, no pollution controls, etc., etc., etc., and you're going to hear
a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country right at a time
when we need the tax base to pay the debt, and pay down the interest on the
debt and get our house back in order") (emphasis added) (Oct. 20, 1992).
78. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 35, at 917-18 n.502 (emphasizing
the role of the author and Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe in discussing
the issue before Congress); See Tribe, supra note 61, at 1234 n.47 (describing
the testimony of various scholars, including himself and Yale law professor
Bruce Ackerman, in Congressional hearings regarding the approval of the
WTO).
79. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1041 ( Jan 10, 1994).
80. Id. at 550 (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Public Citizen because the President's actions are not "agency action"
and thus cannot be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act).
81. 128 F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 766-67.
83. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp.2d. 1226, 1237
(N.D. Al. 1999).
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both parties acknowledged that no genuine issues of fact
existed. 4
The government responded by characterizing the questions
raised by the plaintiffs as political, and therefore beyond the
reach of the court.85 They argued that foreign affairs and com-
merce are committed to the Executive and Legislative branches
and therefore nonjusticiable.8 6 Made in the USA countered that
the issue was not whether the political branches used their
power to enact good policy, but whether they enacted it using
constitutionally permissible means.8 7 The court reasoned that
"foreign commitments cannot relieve the government of the obli-
gation to operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitu-
tion."88 Because this case involved construing the meaning and
applicability of the Constitution, the political question doctrine
did not apply.8 9
The complaint alleged that NAFTA constituted a treaty as
contemplated by Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion.90 The plaintiffs acknowledged that the text of the Consti-
tution failed to establish a test for determining when an
84. See id. at 1228. The first two issues addressed by the court involved
the standing of the plaintiffs. See id. at 1229. The standing questions consid-
ered whether the plaintiffs suffered injury and whether the Court could redress
those injuries. The Court held that the individual plaintiffs, who alleged a dilu-
tion of voting rights, lacked standing for lack of injury. See id. at 1234. The
institutional plaintiffs, who traced their injuries to the adoption of NAFTA and
subsequent loss of work, successfully established a causal connection and there-
fore standing. See id. at 1253.
Finally the court considered the redressability of plaintiffs injuries. The
government argued that the President need not act based on a decision of the
Court so any alleged injuries would continue. See id. at 1244. Judge Probst
ruled that he could not "conclude that a declaration that NAFTA was unconsti-
tutionally made and implemented would be ignored by the executive branch... I
will not assume that the President will ignore established law. I will not con-
clude that the President, like Andrew Jackson, would state that since the court
has made its decision it could enforce it. I agree with Justice Story, who said in
response 'The Court has done its duty. Let the Nation now do theirs. If we
have a Government, let its command be obeyed; if we have not, it is as well to
know at once, and look to the consequences.'" See id. at 1253. The court found
that plaintiffs alleged injuries would be redressed. See id. at 1254.
85. See id. at 1254.
86. See id. at 1255. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Dole v.
Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 1100 (10th Cir. 1977); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
998 (1979).
87. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1257. See also I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1982).
88. See 56 F. Supp.2d at 1258 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14
(1957)).
89. See id. at 1276.
90. U.S. CoNsT. art H, § 2, cl. 2.
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international agreement is a treaty instead of some other kind of
agreement, but argued that framers' intent and court precedent
suggest that a distinction can be drawn. 91 The framers indi-
cated that agreements were treaties when they substantially af-
fected sovereignty. 92  NAFTA, by altering the workplace
standards, enacting binding arbitration procedures, and replac-
ing large bodies of trade law, had substantial impact on
sovereignty.9 3
Similarly, the plaintiffs cited lower courts' decisions on the
constitutional meaning of the term treaty.94 The major con-
straints facing the plaintiffs, according to the government, in-
volved the absence of a definition for "treaty" in the
Constitution's text 95 and that Congress implemented NAFTA
using valid legislation.9 6 The court quickly dismissed the first
argument, noting that using that standard, the court could not
decide most constitutional questions.9 7 Moreover, the Court
noted that because both sides agreed that the Senate could have
legitimately approved NAFTA by two-thirds vote, it is a "treaty"
as contemplated by the Treaty Clause.98 Based on the extensive
debates of the framers and their reliance on the definitional dis-
tinctions drawn by Vattel, the court held that NAFTA is a
treaty.99
Judge Probst recognized the importance of his decision, not-
ing that Made in the USA's suit brings to bear an "almost cen-
tury-long bout of Constitutional theorizing about whether the
Treaty Clause contained in Article II, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution creates the exclusive means of making cer-
tain types of international agreements." 100
The Government argued that the Constitution allows alter-
native international agreements because the Constitution does
not explicitly outline the Treaty Clause as an exclusive proce-
dure. 101 This silence allows the political branches to conclude
91. See id. at 1278 (quoting Harvard Professor Anne Marie Slaughter's
analysis of framers' intent).
92. See id. at 1282.
93. See id. at 1283-84.
94. See id. at 1312.
95. See id. at 1261.
96. See id. at 1278.
97. See id. at 1261.
98. See id. at 1313. See also Holden v. Joy 84 U.S. 211, 242-3 (1872).
99. See id. at 1315 (assuming in dicta that NAFTA is a treaty for the pur-
poses of analyzing question two). See also FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
100. See id. at 1228.
101. See id. at 1293-94.
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trade agreements through alternative means. 10 2 The rapid
growth in executive agreements in the last fifty years confirms
the legality of the practice. 10 3 Evaluating these arguments, the
court concluded that Congress legally adopted NAFTA because
the Constitution allows Congress and the President to enter into
broad international agreements through methods other than the
"treaty" process. 10 4 The Commerce Clause, with its grant of ple-
nary power,' 0 5 gives Congress broad powers to regulate com-
merce.10 6 Because NAFTA regulates international trade, a type
of commerce, the court held that Congress passed it constitu-
tionally.'07 The Court found no reason to believe the Treaty
Clause limits Congress's Commerce Clause power.' 0 8
IV. FLAWS IN MADE IN THE USA FOUNDATION: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NAFTA
A. NAFTA Is A TREATY
The district court correctly determined that NAFTA is a
treaty within the meaning established by the framers and the
Constitution. To determine whether an international agree-
ment is a treaty, the Court must use a number of factors, influ-
enced by the framers' priorities in drafting the text.10 9 The
framers distinguished a treaty from a congressional-executive
agreement by providing that a treaty (1) is extensive in scope
and duration; and (2) affects issues of sovereignty." 0
102. See id. at 1293-94. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316, 318 (1936); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30
(1982); United States v. Belmont; 301 U.S. 324 (1936); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 194 (1941).
103. See id. at 1290. See also BYRD, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
104. See id. at 1316.
105. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 187-88 (1824).
106. See 56 F. Supp.2d at 1316-17.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1319.
109. See id. at 1280; see also BYRD, supra note 8, at 133 (reviewing factors to
be considered in determining if an international agreement is a treaty). For an
alternative solution to the problem of classifying international agreements, see
Randall, supra note 9, at 1112-22 (proposes a topical distinction to determine
whether a treaty or a congressional-executive agreement should be utilized
which does not, however, place trade agreements in either category, or discuss
how to evaluate other agreements not considered by his article).
110. See VATTEL, supra note 21 and accompanying text (outlining factors to
be considered in determining the nature of an international agreement).
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NAFTA Is THE UNITED STATES' LARGEST REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENT
The framers adopted Vattel's interpretation of treaty as "the
proper instrument of a major commitment and the executive
agreement as the instrument of a minor one."11' NAFTA sub-
jects entire new areas of economic activity to international trade
regulation, including trade service regulations, intellectual
property and investment protections, and non-discrimination
and non-residency rules.'1 2 More importantly, NAFTA includes
binding international arbitration panels, whose determinations
will bind American governing bodies." 3 As the most important
regional trade agreement ever negotiated by the United States,
NAFTA is certainly a major commitment. 114
NAFTA SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS STATE AND PERSONAL
SOVEREIGNTY
The framers emphasized the effect of an international
agreement on sovereignty as central to its characterization. 115
Attempts to protect state sovereignty, particularly of the South-
ern states, guided the debate about the Treaty Clause during
the Constitutional Convention." 6 Madison, for example, argued
that the Treaty Clause included a supermajority provision be-
cause treaties can alter both external relations and the internal
code. 1 7 The framers specifically selected the Senate as the
treaty ratifying body and required a supermajority vote to in-
sure protection of both individual and state interests."z 8
111. See 56 F. Supp.2d at 1280.
112. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1283.
113. See id. at 1283-84.
114. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing NAFTA as the
scope and duration of NAFTA); see also Jim C. CHEN, Appointments with Disas-
ter: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the United
States-Canada Free Trade, 49 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 1455 (1992).
115. See HENKIN, supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting framers con-
cerns in creating the treaty power). See also supra Tribe, note 61, at 1267 (ty-
ing the impact of an agreement on sovereignty to its connection to matters
normally regulated by state and federal governments).
116. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining reasons Senate
chosen as legislative participant in the treaty process); see also Sklamberg,
supra note 12, at 454 (surveying views of Northern and Southern delegates on
the outcome of the Treaty Clause debate).
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reviewing Madison's writing
on the Treaty Clause).
118. See supra notes 10, 12, 14, 21 and accompanying text (outlining the
rationale for placing authority in the Senate).
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NAFTA, by altering both foreign and state law-making au-
thority, constrains state sovereignty in exactly the manner
feared by the framers. 119 NAFTA imposes on states and busi-
nesses new health, environmental and safety standards, all tra-
ditionally regulated through states' exercise of their police
power. 120 The framers created the supermajority requirement
to check the imposition of rigid public safety standards for the
benefit of international trade. 12 By requiring a two-thirds vote,
national interests receive a greater voice and compromise grows
in an effort to gain sufficient support to approve the agreement.
B. THE TREATY CLAusE Is EXCLusIvE
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution explicitly
sets forth the procedure by which the United States may enter
into treaties.' 22 The text includes no alternative methods of en-
tering treaties; similarly, the text affords the House no role in
the approval of these international agreements.' 23 The Made in
the USA court, while correctly determining that NAFTA is a
treaty within the meaning of the Treaty Clause, erroneously
permitted alternate means of treaty adoption. This ruling was
made in direct contravention of the text of the Constitution, the
intent of the framers, and federal court precedent, all three of
which collectively prove the exclusivity of the Treaty Clause.
CASE PRECEDENT AND EXCLUSIVITY
The Supreme Court has repeatedly restricted executive and
legislative action when it exceeds constitutionally provided
power. In three cases involving improper exercise of presiden-
tial and congressional power, the Supreme Court evaluated the
Constitution's text and framers' intent in tandem.
119. See NAFTA, art. 105 at 728. See also Tribe, supra note 61, at 1267-68
(indicating that NAFTA removes legislative powers normally reserved to state
and federal legislatures and places them under the law of the treaty).
120. See e.g. NAFTA, art. 709 at 971; Id., art. 901 at. 998.
121. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (reviewing framers interest
in preserving spheres of state responsibility).
122. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting the constitutional
text).
123. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 406 (noting that the President and Sen-
ate, together, have exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption of treaties); see also
Tribe, supra note 61, at 1242 (describing Hamilton's approach of using the ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius canon to limit provisions of the constitution);
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing Treaty adoption
procedure).
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The case of Buckley v. Valeo 124 addressed the exclusivity of
another Article 2, section 2, clause 2 power (the Appointments
Clause). 125 In interpreting the exclusivity of this clause, the
court relied on the lack of alternative textual procedures for ap-
pointments 126 and on the framers' desire to secure a separation
of powers throughout the document. 127 The Court found that
the text defines a method by which the President nominated su-
perior officers to the Senate for their advice and consent, thus
eliminating any alternative procedures. 128 Of equal importance,
the Court found that the Appointments Clause, by prescribing
an adoption procedure, preserves the Constitution's structural
integrity by forestalling the aggrandizement of power by one
political branch. 129
The Court applied a similar approach in I.N.S. v. Chadha,
which limits the function of the presentment clause to that pro-
scribed by text because it is "a single, finely wrought and ex-
haustively considered, procedure." 130 The Court synthesized
this standard into a two-part analysis in Clinton v. City of New
York, in which the Supreme Court found powerful reasons to
construe constitutional silence on presidential and congressional
power as equivalent to an express prohibition.'13 The Court rec-
ognized the level of detail in the procedures laid out in the
text 132 and the significance of the framers' lengthy debate in
considering a portion of the Constitutional text as indicative of
exclusivity. 133 The history of the Treaty Clause indicates that it
satisfies both of these concerns.
124. 424 U.S. 1, 124-5 (1975) (asking whether art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 provides the
sole means of executive appointment).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Note that the framers grouped the
Treaty Clause and Appointment Clause.
126. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 127.
127. See id. at 124.
128. See id.
129. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (citing Buckley
with approval regarding the appointment of military judges).
130. See 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1982) (holding that legislative veto violated the
Presentment Clause).
131. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2103 (1998) (holding the line-
item veto unconstitutional). Cf Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1057-58
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that the Treaty Clause supersedes the Property Clause
and this allowing transfer of Panama Canal).
132. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2107 (holding that line-item veto not envi-
sioned by the Constitution's "finely wrought' procedure).
133. See id. at 2103 (arguing that Article I procedures resulted from great
debate and compromise).
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The extensive debate between the Founding Fathers con-
cerning international obligations and treaty formation indicates
the necessity of a two-thirds vote.' 3 ' In fact, Alexander Hamil-
ton specifically advanced the selection of the two-thirds require-
ment in the Treaty Clause as a highlight of the Constitution and
strong rationale for its ratification.135 The concerns expressed
in the framers' debate during drafting of the Treaty Clause re-
sulted in the incorporation of a supermajority, separate from the
grant of legislative power in Article I of the Constitution.13 6
The structure of the Treaty Clause process and its incorpo-
ration of checks and balances further indicates exclusivity.' 37
By providing the President with the authority to negotiate, and
the Senate with the responsibility to ratify, the framers created
a procedure consistent with the multiple branch provisions
found throughout the Constitution's text.'3 8 The intent of the
drafters supports an interpretation of a limited treaty clause.
CONSTRUING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NAFTA
NAFTA violates the Constitution because Congress adopted
the agreement pursuant to fast track procedure instead of com-
plying with the requirements of the Treaty Clause.139 Congress
failed to enact NAFTA by the required supermajority vote.140
More importantly, fast track involves a congressional delegation
of power to the President that exceeds the scope envisioned by
the framers, upsetting the checks and balances central to federal
policy making.'14 Congress cannot evade this constitutional lim-
134. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (illustrating the framers'
motivations).
135. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (quoting Hamilton's approval
of the Treaty Clause).
136. U.S. CONST. art I. See Borchard, supra note 37, at 671 (arguing that all
important constitutionally significant legislative actions require a
supermajority vote, e.g.: impeachment (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, subd. 7); propo-
sal and ratification of constitutional amendments (U.S. CONST. art. V); adoption
of treaties (U.S. CoNsT. art. II. § 2, cl. 2)).
137. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 1241 (finding exclusivity central to state
protecting structure of the Constitution and Treaty Clause).
138. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTMUToNAL DipLOMACY 138 (1990).
139. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (outlining the difference
between fast track procedures and the Treaty Clause requirements).
140. See supra note 70-72 and accompanying text (stating the method by
which Congress approved NAFTA under fast track procedures).
141. See Koh, supra note 48, at 161-62 (discussing arguments voiced by Pub-
lic Citizen in their objections to NAFTA).
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itation by adopting NAFTA using the Commerce Clause. 142 In
the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton specifically stated
that the power to make treaties provides a specific power sepa-
rate from Congress' authority to enact laws. 143 The Constitu-
tion explicitly explains how the government should pass treaties
and in no place suggests that an alternative method would work
as well."4
The Court's interpretation of framers' intent supports a re-
treat from the unlimited use of congressional-executive agree-
ments. Holmes v. Jennison, the earliest Supreme Court case
addressing the scope of the Treaty Clause, includes an analysis
of framers intent.145 In his decision, Justice Taney states that
the provision was designed to include all the subjects "which in
the ordinary intercourse of nations had usually been made sub-
jects of negotiation and treaty."146 The cases cited by the gov-
ernment for the proposition that the government can use
treaties and executive agreements interchangeably differ sub-
stantially from the principal case.
142. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 1250-51 (allowing Congress to enter inter-
national agreements though the Commerce Clause ignores the meaning of sev-
eral other portions of the text).
143. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No.
64 (John Jay). While it may initially seem that this interpretation binds con-
temporary society to the sometimes vague and often difficult to ascertain intent
of the framers, it instead focuses on fidelity to the text. See Ronald Dworkin,
The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe and Nerve, 65 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1249, 1251-52 (1997) (explaining the differences between original-
ism and text). Context, however, is often needed to determine the precise
meaning of text. Therefore, reference to framers' intent is often necessary. See
id. at 1253.
Because the Constitution is binding law, the intent of its drafters is impor-
tant in determining its meaning. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 145 (1990). Contemporary
Supreme Court law indicates that the current Court also continues to respect
framers' intent. See e.g. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2108-2110
(1998) (Kennedy, concurring) (arguing framers' intent key to achieving the lib-
erty the constitution establishes); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-583
(1995) (Kennedy, concurring) (using framers' intent to understand Commerce
Clause issue); United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S.
123, 131 (1972) (Douglas, dissenting) (advocating the use of framers' intent to
determine reach of First Amendment in regulation of pornography).
144. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 1250-51 (discussing why, given the text of
the Constitution, the Treaty Clause must be exclusive).
145. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569-70 ) (1840) (evaluating fram-
ers' intent on the meaning of the term "treaty").
146. Id.
2000] MADE IN THE USA FOUN-DATION V. UNITED STATES 685
For example, the Court's decisions in Altman & Co v. United
States147 and Weinberger v. Rossi'4 both define "treaty"
broadly, but do so in terms of statutory interpretation. More-
over, both decisions explicitly state that the Constitution re-
quires a more rigorous definition of treaty. 149 Similarly, the
Star-Kist Foods Inc. v. United States decision notes that Con-
gress has the authority to pass customs agreements, 150 which
rise neither to the size nor the scope of NAFTA.
As a practical matter, not all international agreements can
constitute "treaties" as intended by the framers. 151 However, as
with the line-item veto, there is no provision in the constitution
that authorizes the Congress and President to adopt treaties by
congressional-executive agreement. 152 There are some areas
that are properly the subjects of treaties and not fit for congres-
sional executive agreements. "To deny this proposition is to af-
firm another, that there is no longer an arrangement of
constitutionally distributed powers in the United States but
rather a unitary form of government exists." 53 The Treaty
Clause provides a balanced distribution of powers that Congress
should have used to pass NAFTA, a treaty as envisioned by the
framers. If the law intends to maintain some semblance of tra-
dition, dependability and reverence for the Constitution as en-
acted, then Congress and the President must enact treaties
through the procedure provided by the Treaty Clause.' 54
147. 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912) (recognizing the validity of an international
compact regulating commercial relations).
148. 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982) (determining Congress' intended meaning of the
term "treaty" in the statute at issue).
149. See id. at 29-30; Altman, 224 U.S. 582 at 601; Edye v. Robertson, 112
U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
150. See 47 C.C.P.A. 52, 64, 275 F.2d 472, 483 (CCPA 1959).
151. See BYRD, supra note 8, at 132 (stating that the law should distinguish
between treaties and international agreements); see also Tribe, supra note 61,
at 1266 (arguing that framers distinguished between types of international
agreements in their understanding of foreign relations).
152. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 at 2103 (1998) (argu-
ing that the failure of the framers to include a line-item veto weighed strongly
toward the final decision to declare the mechanism unconstitutional).
153. BYRD, supra note 8, at 115 (noting that the constitution lacks any provi-
sion authorizing congressional-executive agreements and questioning their le-
gality for certain types of agreements); see Tribe, supra note 61, at 1237 (noting
that constitutional text cannot be interpreted in a way that alters the structure
of government or the fundamental relationships between the federal govern-
ment's component parts).
154. Cf I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982) (noting that the framers
prized values other than efficiency).
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C. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The government, in Made in the USA Foundation, made two
central arguments under the guise ofjusticiability and the polit-
ical question doctrine. 155 First, it argued that fast track negoti-
ating procedure and congressional-executive agreements have
become de facto legal. Second, it argued that the political
branches should address questions concerning the division of
power between Congress and the President. The Court has held,
however, that acting beyond constitutionally established powers
constitutes an abuse of power.156 Overreaching by any sover-
eign actor undermines our structure of government. Similarly,
the Court cannot uphold procedures contrary to the Constitution
no matter how efficient or convenient. 157
Next, supporters of the congressional-executive agreement
argue, in part, that the Senate's apparent acquiescence to its
lost authority in the approval of international agreements
amounts to constitutional acceptability. 158 This argument is
flawed for two reasons. First, the framers designed this consti-
tutional provision to protect minority interests in the Senate; as
a result, there is no reason to expect that a majority of Congress
would object to the change in procedure. More importantly, to
allow the political branches to evaluate constitutionality chips
away at fundamental liberty by violating the separation of pow-
ers. 159 Additionally, perpetuation of a manifest constitutional
violation will eventually result in declining public respect for the
courts.' 60 While the general population may not lose respect for
a government that enters trade agreements in violation of its
founding document, similar violations in areas of free speech,
155. See 56 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
156. See Lillian B. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: A Question of
Time or Law?, 66 G. WASH. L. REv. 1112, 1114 (1998).
157. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462. U.S. 919, 944 (1982).
158. See Henkin supra note 18, at 423 (stating that the Senate consents
each time it approves an executive-congressional agreement). See Made in the
USA Found., 56 F. Supp.2d at 1268-69 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
159. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2108-9 (Kennedy, concur-
ring) (arguing that preserving separation of powers is central to American con-
ceptions of liberty). The fact that a branch of government surrenders its own
authority offers no defense, for voluntary action does not make cession of power
innocuous. Id. "Abdication of responsibility," Kennedy notes, "is not part of the
constitutional design." Id.
160. See GLENNON, supra note 29, at 871 (noting that "the moral cost of per-
mitting a manifest constitutional violation to continue, both to society in gen-
eral and to the supreme court in particular, far outweighs whatever benefits"
derive from avoiding political questions). See Tribe, supra note 61, at 1282
(comparing Chadha to the Treaty Clause).
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equal protection or voting rights could not go unchallenged.
Should the Court decline to review a violation of plain constitu-
tional text simply because the political branches of government
acquiesced in its perpetuation, it would be setting a dangerous
precedent. In Chadha, the Court explicitly rejected this de-
fense161 and overturned hundreds of statutes with a single
decision.
Finally, the government provided a laundry list of policy
risks stemming from a decision for the plaintiffs in the principal
case. The United States essentially argues that a decision in
favor of the plaintiffs would remove the ability of the Federal
Government to enter international agreements. 16 2 However,
the Federal Government would still negotiate and enter interna-
tional agreements, compacts and treaties as envisioned by the
framers.' 63 Less significant agreements than NAFTA would
still proceed through customary congressional-executive agree-
ment procedures while the Senate would consider treaties nego-
tiated by the President through a supermajority vote.
V. REINTRODUCING THE TREATY CLAUSE AND
PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
The Made in the USA Foundation v. United States opinion
represents a radical shift away from the distribution of power
established by the Constitution. While the decision certainly
provides stability to our trading regime and ensures Congres-
sional involvement in United States foreign relations, it poses a
threat for the future legitimacy of both political decision-making
and constitutional stability. As explained, the passage of
NAFTA, using fast track negotiating procedure instead of the
Treaty Clause represents a radical switch from constitutionally
authorized process.' 64 "Constitutional legitimacy requires that
both Congress and the President, when exercising authority in
foreign affairs, justify their actions in constitutional text or im-
plication." 65 When the branches act beyond their constitution-
161. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp. at 1266 (N.D. Ala. 1999); see
supra Tribe, note 61, at 1281.
162. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp. at 1264-65 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
163. See THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison) (arguing that drafters
placed power in the Senate to garner the esteem of foreign powers).
164. Cf. Borchard, supra note 37 (arguing that replacement of the Treaty
Clause with the political congressional-executive agreement disrupts Constitu-
tional stability).
165. HENKiN, supra note 10, at 29.
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ally limited powers, the legitimacy of the entire text is
threatened.
While conceptually the decline of the Treaty Clause may
seem a purely academic issue, the weakening of the Constitution
involves practical considerations as well. In the absence of en-
forceable procedure ensuring checks and balances, political ag-
grandizement can occur.166 For example, disappointed with the
recent failure in the Senate of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,167
or any other agreement named as a Treaty, the President and
his supporters could resubmit the same proposal as a congres-
sional-executive agreement. Similarly, the President and parti-
san supporters could pass international trade agreements that
affect geographic regions, racial groups, or domestic industries
disproportionately.168 While these agreements could pass a
Senate utilizing a supermajority requirement, the imposition of
a greater approval requirement should significantly limit the
ability of any interest group to enter major international com-
mitments that deliberately damage a competing interest group.
Looking beyond the Treaty Clause and international agree-
ments, the failure of Congress and the President to recognize the
supermajority requirement for treaties risks their refusal to rec-
ognize it in other constitutionally mandated situations. 169 If the
Court finds that the Constitution allows a simple majority vote
to enter international agreements, it could have difficulty re-
quiring the supermajority for impeachment, or the override of
the presidential veto. 170 Considering the increasingly partisan
nature of national politics, a simple majority requirement could
ease the removal of the President from office. 17' Similarly, the
166. See FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
167. See David E. Sanger, Defeat of A Treaty: The Overview, THE NEW YORK
TIMEs Al (October 15, 1999).
168. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (impeachment); U.S. CONST. art. V
(amendments). See also Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in
the Constitution: The Framers, The Federalist Papers and The Reinforcement of
a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 363 (1998) (arguing that
in their specific context, constitutional supermajority rules further popular
sovereignty).
170. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
171. See Alison Mitchell, The President's Trial: the Overview; Senate Con-
demns Clinton in Debate; Is Ready to Acquit, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Feb. 12,
1999 at Al. See also e.g. Lori Fisher Damrosch, Impeachment as a Technique of
Parliamentary Control Over Foreign Affairs in a Presidential System?, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1525 (1999) (arguing that impeachment pressure rises over Con-
gressional dissatisfaction with a President's foreign policy and that this use vio-
lates that which was intended by drafters); Mark R. Slusar, Comment, The
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number of proposed constitutional amendments 7 2 approved
might rise rapidly, avoiding the non-partisan, national interest
requirement the framers considered when adopted the two-
thirds requirement. 173
Finally, maintaining the supermajority requirement for
treaties, as well as for the other procedures in which it is used,
helps to foster necessary debate and discussion. Because Con-
gress approved NAFTA with a "yes or no" vote under fast
track,174 the legislature lost the "advice and consent"175 power
that normally allows the Senate to shape international trea-
ties.176 The procedure created by the Constitution specifically
allowed for extended debate by those citizens with the most
political information, ability, and national interest. 77 Political
debate enhances the public involvement in the political process,
legitimizes the final decisions, and furthers the public good.' 78
In the absence of political debate and discussion, it is more likely
that sentiment, special interests, or the elite will control deci-
sion making.17 9
The Court has an obligation to end this encroachment. Our
nation's system of governance and the freedoms protected under
Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of Process in the Aftermath of the
Clinton Impeachment, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869 (1999) (arguing that vari-
ances from the framers' intended impeachment process weaken the Constitu-
tion); Michael Stokes Paulson, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337 (1999) (discussing United States v.
Nixon).
172. See U.S. CONST. art V. See also e.g. Mason Kalfus, The Limits on the
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments Violate Article V, 66 U. CH. L. REV.
437 (1999) (arguing that time limits in the amendment process disrupt the con-
stitutional balance of power).
173. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the im-
peachment provisions). Alexander Hamilton explained that the drafters' in-
cluded stringent requirements for impeachment to prevent decisions based on
partisan strength not guilt or innocence. Id.
174. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (explaining the fast track
adoption procedures).
175. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
176. See Borchard, supra note 21, at 667 (noting the role of the Senate in
helping to create foreign policy as conceived by the framers).
177. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
178. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that factional
debate results in the public good).
179. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-380 (1927)
(Brandeis, concurring) (stating that the framers' conceived of speech as essen-
tial to public information and effective decision-making); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919) (Holmes, dissenting) (explaining that
debate is essential to promote a marketplace of ideas).
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our Constitution rely on adherence to the meanings established
by our Founders and retained through judicial interpretation. 80
The Constitution's architectural safeguards were specially designed to
protect the states, citizens, and each branch of the federal government
both from aggrandizement of power and from neglect of constitutional
responsibility by those who temporarily hold public office - even when
such aggrandizement or neglect seems wise as a matter of policy.
18 1
While NAFTA may provide sound policy, the destabilizing
effects on governmental structure and harmful implications for
constitutional legitimacy indicate that upon review the courts
should find it unconstitutional.
180. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 G.
WASH. L. REv 1119, 1121 (1998) (stating that the Constitution is a contract; for
political legitimacy, the Court must provide society with consistent interpreta-
tions of its terms).
181. Tribe, supra note 61, at 1282.
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